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INTRODUCTION
This Article takes a slightly different tack on the symposium's topic of
amending the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It considers a case
* Professor of Law and Richard A. Vachon, S.J., Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. The author wishes to thank Brian Ewing for his patient and excellent research
assistance. As a matter of disclosure, the author was one of the authors of an amicus brief in
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the case discussed in this Article. The co-
author of that brief was Robert Dreher, of the Georgetown University Environmental Law
Clinic, to whom the author of this Article owes much thanks for his insight and critique of
the ideas expressed here.
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recently decided by the Supreme Court, Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance,' which deals with the availability of judicial review to
remedy agency inaction, and uses it as an example of the difficulties that
might accompany attempts to amend the APA. Part I briefly presents
Southern Utah. Part II discusses how proper resolution of the reviewability
and remedy issues the case poses depends heavily on the particular type of
statutory duty alleged to have been neglected. Part III builds on that
discussion to argue that the diversity of types of agency actions that exist
today makes it difficult to codify more precise statutory guidance with
regard to both reviewability and deference standards. This Article
concludes by considering the appropriate scope and subject matter for
amendments to the APA.
I. THE SOUTHERN UTAH CASE
Southern Utah involves a challenge by environmentalists to alleged
failures by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to manage certain
public lands in Utah in conformance with the Federal Land Policy
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).' The lands at issue have been
designated as "Wilderness Study Areas" (WSAs), which identifies them as
eligible for congressional designation as wilderness lands under the
Wilderness Act of 1964. 3 Once a parcel is designated as a WSA, the BLM
is required to manage it so it retains unimpaired its characteristics as
wilderness, and thus its suitability for later congressional designation as
wilderness.
Environmental groups sued BLM in 1999, claiming that the agency
failed this "non-impairment" standard by neglecting to take several actions
necessary to preserve the lands as required by statute.4 For example, the
plaintiffs claimed that BLM failed to keep its promise to designate routes
for use by off-road vehicles (ORVs), effectively keeping the entire area
open to ORV use and impairing the land's wilderness characteristics.5 The
district court dismissed the claims, but a divided panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the non-impairment
standard was a mandatory statutory duty that the courts had jurisdiction to
enforce under the APA.6
1. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2,373 (2004).
2. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000).
4. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. at 2,378.
5. Id. at 2,381-82 (finding plaintiff's claims moot due to BLM's completion of a route
designation plan).
6. Id. at 2,378 (noting the Tenth Circuit's decision that BLM could be compelled to
comply with a non-impairment obligation).
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In reaching the Supreme Court, the case presented the issue of whether
federal courts had jurisdiction to order BLM to protect the WSAs or,
contrarily, whether the challenged agency conduct was not "final agency
action" that could be reviewed pursuant to APA § 704 or be subject to
judicial compulsion under § 706 (1). The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed the Tenth Circuit and held that federal
courts did not have jurisdiction to review claims that the agency inaction
violated of FLPMA's non-impairment standard.7
II. "AGENCY ACTION," FINALITY, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN
SOUTHERN UTAH
Southern Utah raised questions about the proper understanding of
"agency action" generally, the finality of such action, and the appropriate
conditions under which courts should compel agencies to act. This part of
the Article examines those issues, considers the Supreme Court's resolution
of them, and explains how their appropriate resolution should have turned
more on the particular nature of the duties the agency was alleged to have
violated.
A. "Agency Action"
The APA's definition of "agency action" explicitly includes a "failure to
act" within its exemplars. 8 A moment's reflection on the realities of the
modem administrative state reveals the logic behind the breadth of that
definition. If part of the purpose of the definition of "agency action" is to
identify the proper subjects of judicial review-and surely this is one of its
purposes-then agency "action" must include failures to act for the simple
reason that judicial correction of agency nonfeasance is every bit as
important to the rule of law as judicial correction of agency malfeasance. 9
7. Id. The Supreme Court's reasoning is discussed below. See discussion infra Parts I
and II. The environmental groups also claimed that the BLM had violated mandatory duties
located in Land Management Plans adopted by the agency and had failed to consider
whether increased ORV use necessitated a supplemental environmental impact statement
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(2000). Like the first claim, the Supreme Court rejected these latter claims, which this
Article does not discuss. Id.
8. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000). For convenience, this
Article refers to APA sections by their placement in Title 5 of the United States Code.
9. The term "agency action" appears in § 701 ("agency action" committed to agency
discretion by law is not subject to judicial review), § 702 (authorizing suit by any person
"suffering legal wrong because of agency action" or "adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action"), § 704 ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action.
. are subject to judicial review"), § 705 (authorizing courts to postpone the effective dates
of "an agency action" when required), § 706 (authorizing courts to "compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" and to "hold unlawful and set aside agency
action" that fails the appropriate standard of review"). 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Indeed, the
term "agency action" appears more in Chapter 7 than any other place in the APA. Id.
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The similarity between administrative malfeasance and nonfeasance has
been understood since the New Deal. Courts and commentators during that
era began to understand that statutorily granted rights enjoy equal
importance and dignity as the common law rights that had previously
occupied a preferred station. l The basis for this doctrinal shift was the
recognition that common law rights and statutory rights equally reflect
policy judgments by government decisionmakers and thus merit equal
judicial vindication. This understanding has greatly influenced modem
administrative law doctrine, from procedural due process 1 to APA
standing 12 to Article III standing. 13 Because vindication of statutory rights
often requires affirmative government action in a way that vindication of
common-law rights generally does not, according equal status to both
means that courts must sometimes compel government action, not just
restrain it.
This straightforward explanation, however, fails to capture the full
complexity of the issue. In Southern Utah, BLM argued that its alleged
failure to maintain the WSAs did not constitute "agency action," much less
"final agency action." The agency argued that § 551(13)'s inclusion of "a
failure to act" as an example of an "agency action" should be read in light
of that provision's other examples of "agency action," which it argued were
10. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (holding that a state statute that
fixed milk prices did not violate equal protection or due process principles); West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law for women against a
due process attack); Kimberl Crenshaw & Garry Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream
Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1683, 1691 (1998) ("The [legal] realists uncovered
how the common law baseline ... was itself constituted through policy decisions....
Accordingly, to permit legislatures rather than common-law judges to set those necessarily
regulative baselines would not introduce regulation, but instead substitute one set of policy
decisions for another.").
11. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that
once a state college instructor completed the terms of his contract, he had no protected 14th
Amendment interest in continued employment).
12. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
(noting that standing is partially dependent upon the interests protected or regulated by a
statute). This progression of administrative standing law has had the effect of allowing suit
by holders of statutorily based interests. See Richard Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1723-24 (1975) (describing the traditional
standing model where common law rights were the only ones whose deprivation provided a
plaintiff with standing, and explaining the evolution of administrative law to allow plaintiffs
to sue when statutorily-granted rights were impaired); see also LouIs JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 505-13 (1965) (reviewing early developments of the
federal law of standing).
13. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("As Government programs and policies become more complex and far
reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have
clear analogs in our common-law tradition.... In my view, Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before .. "); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)
(finding Article Ill injury in the deprivation of a statutorily-granted right to truthful
information about the availability of rental housing).
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all discrete, rather than ongoing, actions.1 4 Based on BLM's conclusion
that the affirmative agency actions included in § 551(13) were all discrete,
rather than ongoing, the agency argued that the converse must be true,
too-that the failures to act brought under the definition of "agency action"
should be limited to failures to take such discrete actions.' 5
The Supreme Court agreed. It stated that "a failure to act" was "properly
understood to be limited, as are the other items in § 551(13), to a discrete
action.' 6 To understand the Court's reasoning, it is useful to have the text
of § 551(13) close at hand: "'agency action' includes the whole or a part of
an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
thereof, or failure to act."'17 Before getting to "failure to act," the Court
first considered the previous phrase, "or the equivalent or denial thereof,"
which appears after the list of examples of specific affirmative agency
actions. The Court first reasoned that this phrase required that other
affirmative actions coming under the umbrella of "the equivalent...
thereof' must be similarly discrete to the listed examples, since otherwise
they would not be "equivalent."' 8 Second, the Court reasoned that the
same phrase's inclusion of "or denial thereof' must refer to denials that
were either denials of the five listed examples of affirmative agency action
(and thus, of course, discrete), or, at most, denials of the "equivalents" the
statute referenced (those equivalents being, as just noted, also discrete
actions). 19 The Court then asserted that "'failure to act' is . . . properly
understood as a failure to take ... one of the agency actions (including
their equivalents) defined in § 551(13). ' '20 As support for this assertion, the
Court simply cited the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis to "attribute
to... 'failure to act' the same characteristic of discreteness shared by all
the preceding items.'
Despite its neatness (or indeed, perhaps because of it), the Court's
analysis cuts against the logic of modem administrative law. Just as
modem administrative law rejects a distinction between reviewability of
agency malfeasance and nonfeasance generally, the evolution of
administrative regulation counsels against a per se rule immunizing
ongoing nonfeasance from judicial review. Administrative responsibilities
have progressed far beyond the traditional focus on licensing and rate
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000) (stating that "'agency action' includes the whole or a
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure to act").
15. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2,373 (2004).
16. Id. at 2,379 (emphasis in original).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
18. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. at 2378.
19. Id. at 2,379.
20. Id.
21. Id. (parentheses omitted).
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setting that characterized administrative action during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.22 Such traditional functions are marked by
discrete points of contact between the agency and private parties, most
notably, the'licensing and ratemaking proceedings that set the terms under
which private parties can then go into and act in a market. Those functions
remain important, but have been supplemented by more direct regulation of
relationships between private parties. Examples of such direct regulation
include ongoing governmental supervision of capital markets, the
government's direct provision of ongoing benefits such as income
maintenance and social insurance payments, and, as in Southern Utah,
government commitments to manage its own activities and assets in ways
responsive to interests championed by private parties.2 3 These types of
functions involve more intensive and continuous regulation than periodic
licensing or rate-setting.
Such ongoing regulatory mandates reflect the same type of policy
choices reflected in grants of more discrete regulatory authority. The only
difference is that the nature of the regulatory problems requires a different
form of administrative action. The existence of these diverse forms of
regulation requires that courts consider the particular nature of the agency's
mandate when deciding reviewability issues.
The APA's judicial review provisions reflect a spirit of flexibility. The
APA's presumption of judicial review indicates the drafters' unwillingness
to see formalistic barriers frustrate the availability of a judicial check on
24
agency action. Judicial flexibility is also reflected in the APA's grant of
broad latitude with regard to the proper form of proceeding. 25 It is also
apparent in the broad definition of "agency action" in § 551(13), as
understood by the drafters and the Court itself on other occasions.26 These
provisions, by making agency action presumptively reviewable, defining
22. See Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the
Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 473 (2003) (noting that "administrative
agencies have assumed an increasingly important role in the legal regulation of economic
and social activity...."); STEVEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 19 (5th ed. 2002) (outlining the rise of
administrative regulation from 1875-1930).
23. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 482 (contrasting early administrative agency
adjudicatory with more recent administrative rulemaking).
24. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (noting the presumption of
judicial review).
25. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2000) (outlining that "[t]he form of proceeding for judicial
review is the special statutory proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified
by statute, or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal
action .... "); see also 5 U.S.C. § 705 ("On such conditions as may be required and to the
extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court ... may issue all
necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to
preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.").
26. See infra note 29.
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"agency action" broadly, and providing reviewing courts with latitude in
regard to both the forms of proceeding and relief available to parties
challenging agency action, combine to paint a coherent overall picture of
the APA in which maximum opportunities are available for parties to seek
meaningful judicial review consistent with a respect for the discretion
retained by the agency.
Against this understanding, the Court's statutory interpretation analysis
appears remarkably weak. Section 551(13)'s list of types of specific
affirmative agency actions begins with "includes" rather than the more
restrictive "means;" the significance of this difference is suggested by the
care with which the APA's drafters distinguished between them when
defining the statute's terms. 27  Thus, it is at least a bit inaccurate to
characterize affirmative agency actions brought under the APA's umbrella
as necessarily sharing the common characteristic of discreteness. 28 If that
step by the Court is inappropriate, then the ejusdem generis argument adds
nothing. When this weak analysis is put up against the legislative history
of the Act 29 and the policy analysis presented above, the weakness of the
Court's conclusion becomes apparent.
Still, striking the proper balance between ensuring maximum review
opportunities and respecting agency discretion requires courts to consider
the details of the particular agency action. Judicial review of ongoing
agency responsibilities runs the risk of interfering with the agency's
exercise of its discretion. The complexities inherent in striking this balance
and the corresponding need for case-by-case decisionmaking are illustrated
when concerns about finality are added into the analysis.
B. The Finality Requirement
Section 704 of the APA confines the default availability of judicial
review to instances of "final" agency action. 30 Confining judicial review to
27. Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 (1), (4), (5), (6), (7), (12), (14) (beginning the definition
with "means" rather than "includes"), with §§ 551(2), (3), (8), (9), (10), (11), (13) (1945)
(beginning the definition with "includes" rather than "means").
28. Cf Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2,373, 2,378 (2004) (stating
that "an 'equivalent ... thereof must also be discrete (or it would not be equivalent)"); id.
(adding that "a 'denial thereof must be the denial of a discrete listed action (and perhaps
denial of a discrete equivalent)").
29. See S. REP. No. 752 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, at 198 (1946) (defining "agency action" broadly to
"assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action or
inaction."); see also H.R. REP. No. 1980 (1946), reprinted in ADMIrNiSTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, at 255 (1946) (defining "agency action"
broadly to "assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action
or inaction."); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001) (stating
that the APA "is meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may
exercise its power").
30. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). Section 704 authorizes Congress to make non-final agency
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final agency action allows the agency to correct its own mistakes and
ensures that judicial review is not premature and is instead conducted on a
complete administrative record. 3' These justifications for the finality
requirement apply to the review of claims of ongoing administrative
nonfeasance and require the development of appropriate rules to guide
judicial review when such claims are made.
Administrative law has developed what the Supreme Court has described
as a "pragmatic" approach to finality.32 The Court most recently expressed
the test for administrative action finality in Bennett v. Spear: "First, the
action must mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking
process-it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And
second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.
33
The Bennett formula thus focuses both on the regulator and the regulated
party in determining finality, requiring both that the regulator have
definitively decided the issue and that the regulated party have experienced
some change in its legal status or rights. The Bennett formula also looks to
the underlying rationales for the finality requirement: in particular, the first
prong, by requiring that the administrative process has reached a
conclusion, guards against inappropriate judicial interference in ongoing
administrative decision-making and ensures that judicial review will be
conducted using as full a record as possible. For its part, the second prong
actions reviewable as well. See id ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action ... are subject to judicial review.") (emphasis added). This authorization is
merely declaratory, of course, since Congress always has the power to prescribe procedures
for a particular agency or regulatory program different from the default procedures of the
APA.
31. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
(Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
S. DOC. No. 248, 79TH CONG., at 37 (explaining that subsection 10(c), "defining reviewable
acts, [was] designed also to negative [sic] any intention to make reviewable merely
preliminary or procedural orders."); see also In re Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d
1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (noting that the finality requirement serves to ensure
that judicial review is conducted on a factual record compiled by the agency); Silvia Serpe,
Note, Reviewability of Environmental Impact Statements of Legislative Proposals After
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 438 (1995) (suggesting that a bar to
judicial review until after final agency action is not an obstacle to gaining judicial review);
E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Note, Preserving Review of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory
Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 646-49 (1991) (noting the APA's
broad jurisdictional mandate over final agency action); Raymond Murphy, Note, The Scope
of Review ofAgencies' Refusal to Enforce or Promulgate Rules, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86,
90 n.28 (1984) (highlighting the practical implications of the Supreme Court's failure to
adopt a rule that all decisions to terminate rulemakings constitute final agency action on
future cases).
32. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) ("The cases dealing with
judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the 'finality' element in a
pragmatic way."); see also FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 US. 232, 239 (1980)
(quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).
33. 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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ensures that judicial review is restricted to its proper purpose of vindicating
legal rights.
Still, the underlying logic of the Bennett requirements does not mean that
the Bennett test is easy to apply. Indeed, both of its requirements raise
difficult issues with regard to the type of action challenged in Southern
Utah. While the Supreme Court did not reach the finality question, since it
decided that there was no "agency action" to begin with,34 it remains useful
for the purposes of this Article to consider how courts should deal with the
finality issue when considering claims of ongoing agency inaction.
With regard to the first Bennett prong, it is often difficult to determine
when an agency has concluded its decision-making process when the
plaintiff alleges ongoing nonfeasance. For example, in Southern Utah,
BLM's failure to designate ORV routes on the WSAs in Utah was not
marked by an identifiable decision point. Indeed, the plaintiffs alleged that
the agency simply failed to act. The agency never granted or denied their
request, nor did it even resolve to decide it. Rather, it was as if the issue
never left the agency's metaphorical in-box.
The APA appears to contemplate that inaction of this sort would be
subject to judicial correction. Section 706(1) authorizes courts to "compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.,35 The
reference to action "delayed," especially when distinguished from action
"withheld," clearly suggests judicial authority to review not just an
agency's failure to act but also its failure to decide whether to act.3 6 The
only real question is whether that reference authorizes courts to correct
ongoing failures to decide. Delay in the performance of a discrete action-
for example, in the issuance of a license-can easily be understood as
satisfying the first prong of Bennett, since at some point a delay, for all
intents and purposes, ripens into a denial. By contrast, an ongoing duty is,
at least conceptually, continuously in the agency's decision-making
pipeline. This fact allows the agency to insist that the matter is still
properly before the agency.
At some point, however, a failure to decide whether to perform an
ongoing duty must also ripen into a final act, unless the agency is to have
the power to thwart judicial review by simply defaulting on a particular
regulatory responsibility. Moreover, the fundamental purpose behind
34. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2,373, 2,378-81 (2004).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1) (2000) (emphasis added).
36. See Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1,229, 1,238 (1 1th Cir.
2003) (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78, referring to "inaction that can be said to 'mark
the "consummation" of the agency's decisionmaking process'); see also S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. at 2,379 (finding that "[a] 'failure to act' is not the same
thing as a 'denial.' The latter is the agency's act of saying no to a request; the former is
simply the omission of an action without formally rejecting a request-for example, the
failure to promulgate a rule or take some decision by a statutory deadline").
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Bennett's first prong-to allow agency procedures to take their course
before courts enter the picture-is not served by allowing the ongoing
nature of the action to serve as an excuse for denying judicial review. By
hypothesis, the agency is not acting on the issue; thus, there is no agency
procedure and record creation that warrants judicial delay. Furthermore, it
makes sense in cases such as Southern Utah to read Bennett's first
requirement as satisfied when an agency's delay is so egregious as to
justify a court's conclusion that the agency has effectively defaulted on the
question. Such a rule would prevent a plaintiff from obtaining judicial
review immediately upon discovery that the agency was not fulfilling some
part of its mandate, thus maintaining respect for the agency's
decisionmaking process. At the same time, it would prevent an agency
from evading judicial review by simply never taking a request out of its
inbox.
37
Concededly, a determination whether an agency has effectively defaulted
on a regulatory responsibility would require a great degree of judgment by
courts. This is especially true given the variety of ways in which agencies
can default. Did the agency never act, take some steps toward deciding and
then simply stop, or promise to take some action at a future time, 38 or was
the process commenced and moving forward, albeit slowly? Perhaps more
importantly, what was the nature of the statutorily mandated task? Did it
require a simple binary choice, a multi-stage decisional process, or a
continuously ongoing evaluation? 39 These questions matter to the finality
inquiry because ultimately the authoritativeness of the agency's failure to
act can only be determined in the context of the decisional responsibilities
the statute placed on the agency. Ongoing agency responsibilities are, by
definition, continuously performed by the agency, with individual
components of that responsibility continually working their ways up and
37. Cf City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (finding an
exception to Article III's mootness requirement when the defendant voluntarily ceases the
complained-of activity, on the theory that the defendant should not be able to control the
plaintiffs access to the courts through strategic behavior).
38. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 335 F.3d 849, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding a genuine failure to act when the agency had merely promised to address its
statutory responsibilities in the normal course of revising its management plan for that
particular resource).
39. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 335 F.3d at 856 (finding a genuine failure to act
when the statute mandated the agency to consider taking certain action, analogizing this type
of mandate to that in Mont. Wilderness, 314 F.3d at 1146). Compare Mont. Wilderness
Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 314 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a final "genuine
failure to act" even though the Forest Service had taken some actions, given the statutory
standard which required a particular result, namely, non-impairment of the land's wilderness
values), with Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding no "genuine failure to act" when the statutory standard required monitoring and the
agency performed extensive monitoring even if it "failed to conduct its duty in strict
conformance with" its own regulations).
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down the decisional hierarchy.40 Thus, determining the authoritativeness of
an alleged failure to perform that sort of duty requires sensitivity to the
functions the agency was ordered to perform, the particular action on which
the agency is alleged to have defaulted, and, indeed, the agency's structure
for making the relevant decisions.4'
The second Bennett prong-that "the action must be one by which rights
or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences
will flow",42 -also requires awareness of the regulatory context. Because
these rights, obligations or consequences ultimately flow from the statute, it
becomes necessary to understand the statutory scheme in order to know
when those rights attach. For example, in Southern Utah, the statute
imposed a performance standard-that is, the agency was required to
maintain a certain substantive state of affairs: namely, non-impairment of
WSA's wilderness qualities. Thus, the legal right to non-impaired WSAs
was affected the moment that agency inaction impaired those qualities of a
WSA. This type of statutory responsibility might be contrasted with an
agency's responsibility, for example, to monitor a particular resource for
potential damage,43 or a responsibility to take certain action in pursuit of a
statutory goal.44 In such cases, rights might attach later in the regulatory
process. For example, rights or obligations under a licensing statute might
not attach until the agency has in fact granted, denied, or defaulted on a
license application. The point here is simply that the type of duty placed on
an agency influences the rights the statute might be said to have created.
40. See Daniel P. Selmi, Jurisdiction to Review Agency Inaction Under Federal
Environmental Law, 72 IND. L.J. 65, 81-82 (1996) (exploring the difficulties in determining
whether agency action is 'final action').
41. See id.:
The complexity of EPA regulatory proceedings compounds the problem of
determining whether the agency has taken 'final action.' The statutes setting forth
the court's jurisdiction to review EPA action seem to envision a process by which
the agency's decisionmaking will occur in discrete blocks with easily identifiable
beginnings and endings. In fact, however, the administrative process of
implementing federal environmental law ... has in practice become vastly more
complicated. The EPA often takes a series of sequential actions to address a
common problem, and determining when the Administrator's action is final on any
particular issue in an ongoing regulatory process is problematic, to say the least.
42. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
43. In Mont. Wilderness, the court drew just such a contrast in determining that an
agency's failure to maintain lands governed by the Montana Wilderness Act constituted a
genuine failure to act. 314 F.3d at 1151. In distinguishing Ecology Ctr., 192 F.3d at 922,
the Mont. Wilderness court noted that the agency in Ecology Ctr. had performed more of its
duty than in the instant case. Id. However, the court also noted the different natures of the
mandates in those two cases and implied that that difference mattered when evaluating
whether the agency had in fact genuinely failed to act. Id.
44. For example, a statute, such as the Federal Communications Act, might authorize
the agency to issue licenses in pursuit of some statutory goal, such as the public interest.
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The nature of those rights in turn influences when, per Bennett, the
agency's inaction can be said to have impacted those rights.
C. Liability and Remedial Considerations
Ultimately, the most promising locus for appropriate limits on judicial
control of agency inaction may be at the level of liability and remedy,
rather than jurisdiction. Section 706(l)'s mandate to courts to "compel
agency action . . . unreasonably delayed" clearly contemplates fact-
sensitive judicial examinations of agency decisionmaking when deciding
whether and how to grant relief to parties challenging agency inaction.
In Southern Utah, however, the Supreme Court pretermitted this issue by
concluding that FLPMA's non-impairment mandate did not require
particular discrete action by the agency, and thus did not constitute a legal
requirement to act that could be enforced by a court under § 706(l). 4' The
Court described the non-impairment standard as "mandatory as to the
object to be achieved [i.e., non-impairment], but [leaving] BLM a great
deal of discretion in deciding how to achieve it."'46 According to the Court,
that implementation discretion immunized the agency from judicial
review.47  The Court based its conclusion in part on the tradition of
mandamus review, which the Court said is limited to the enforcement of
duties a government official has no discretion in deciding to perform, even
if the official may have indeed had discretion in making the actual decision
under that duty.48 The Court also cited the need to prevent courts from
interfering with agency policy discretion, which it feared would happen
when plaintiffs brought court challenges to alleged agency failures to
comply with broad statutory mandates.49
The Court's discussion of mandamus review hearkens back to this
Article's earlier discussion of discrete and ongoing agency
responsibilities. 50 As suggested there, the evolution of statutory mandates
to include agency responsibilities of a more ongoing nature should be
matched by a similar evolution of judicial review. Properly conceived,
judicial review of ongoing agency mandates can be consistent with
mandamus practice, and thus with the spirit underlying § 706(1). This can
occur, as long as that review respects the basic distinction between actions
where agencies should retain decisional autonomy and those that are a
matter of statutory duty. For example, statutory duties such as FLPMA's
45. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2,373, 2,381 (2004).
46. Id. at 2,380.
47. See id. at 2,381.
48. See id at 2,379-80.
49. See id. at 2,380-81.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision
in Southern Utah).
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non-impairment mandate provide no discretion as to the final result-the
covered lands must remain in a non-impaired state-but they do allow the
agency discretion with regard to how to achieve that goal.5' By remaining
aware of this distinction, courts performing judicial review under § 706(1)
can remain faithful to mandamus practice while still enforcing the non-
discretionary components of such statutory mandates.
The legal authorization of judicial review under this understanding of
§ 706(1) does not, however, give courts a blank check to compel agency
inaction wherever it exists. Even when enforceable legal duties exist,
§ 706(1) authorizes courts to compel agency action only when
"unreasonably" delayed.52 A D.C. Circuit opinion, Telecommunications
Research Action Center v. FCC (TRAC), has become the leading case
when considering what constitutes such unreasonable delay.53  TRAC
announced that six factors should be considered when determining whether
it was appropriate to compel a delayed agency action.54 When boiled
down, these factors inquire into the relative importance of the actions not
performed and competing priorities, as determined both by Congress and
by the court's own investigation and subject to a rule of reason.
Unquestionably, this type of inquiry is intensely fact-specific.
Moreover, courts in § 706(1) cases have shown a great deal of flexibility
in actually wielding their remedial powers to compel agency action found
to have been unreasonably delayed. Recall the Southern Utah Court's
concern that judicial review of broad statutory mandates would enmesh the
courts in policy disputes that were properly the agency's province.55 The
Court expressed its concern thusly:
If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance
with broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be empowered, as
well, to determine whether compliance was achieved-which would
mean that it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court,
51. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. at 2,380 (finding that "Section 1782(a)
is mandatory as to the object to be achieved, but it leaves the BLM a great deal of discretion
in deciding how to achieve it").
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
53. See 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that, in determining whether an
agency's action was unreasonably delayed under § 706(1), the court should apply a rule of
reason and examine, among other factors, "the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority").
54. See id. (listing these six factors as: (1) a general rule of reason; (2) the existence of a
legislative timetable for agency action; (3) whether human health and welfare are at stake
because of the delay; (4) the effect expediting agency action would have on other agency
activities; (5) "the nature and extent of interests prejudiced by delay;" and (6) that agency
impropriety is immaterial in determining that the agency's action is "unreasonably
delayed").
55. See supra note 49.
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rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory
mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management. 56
This fear reflects a pessimistic view of courts' own capacities for self-
restraint in the use of their equitable powers. This pessimism is surprising,
given the examples of courts exercising § 706(1) power judiciously, not
just with regard to liability, but also with regard to remedy. In some cases,
courts have simply retained jurisdiction of the case in order to supervise the
agency's progress. 57 Other courts have set general timetables for agency
58 stlaction, while still others have issued relatively detailed remedial orders
compelling particular activities.59
This variety of approaches reflects lower courts' recognition that
compelling agency action raises difficult issues of judicial usurpation of
agency discretion and resource allocation. Courts must balance that
concern against the rights impaired by the agency's failure to act, viewed
against the backdrop of the nature of the agency's regulatory
responsibilities. Thus, for example, a judicial remedy for an agency's
failure to decide a license application or commence a rulemaking might
look very different from a remedy for a failure to engage in the
management of a WSA. The variety of approaches courts have used
indicates sensitivity to this problem.60
It makes sense that the nature and context of the agency's delay should
influence the nature of the remedy, just as it should influence the court's
decision whether the agency's delay has been unreasonable. When these
inquiries are combined with the contextual nature of the underlying finality
issue, the appropriate result from Southern Utah should have been a
doctrine that would have developed incrementally, via case-by-case
adjudication of cases arising under widely varying types of statutory
mandates. However, unless the Court turns away from the approach it took
in Southern Utah, that incremental evolution will be stunted.
56. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. at 2381.
57. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 750 F.2d 81, 88-89 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (articulating that CAB shall report its progress to the court every thirty days);
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declaring that the court
will retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the order).
58. See Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (requiring the agency whose
decisions were held to be "unreasonably delayed" to submit within thirty days a schedule for
resolving issues).
59. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(upholding most of the district court's injunction against the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare requiring it to commence various enforcement proceedings against
school districts found to be out of compliance with conditions of federal education grants).
60. See supra notes 57-59.
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1II. TOWARD A PROPER SCOPE FOR APA AMENDMENTS
Southern Utah illustrates the difficulties that can arise when applying the
APA's general provisions to evolving forms of administrative action.
Despite the weaknesses in the Court's analysis, the above discussion
reveals room for reasonable debate as to whether and how courts should
police ongoing agency management responsibilities. Room for
disagreement exists because of the complexity of administrative action and
the need, in turn, for a nuanced approach to judicial review. But if
resolution of that issue largely depends on the particular nature of the
action the agency is alleged not to have performed, then amending the APA
to "resolve" such issues at a macro level would appear to be a fruitless
endeavor.
Indeed, the conclusion that emerges from the above discussion of
Southern Utah is that the diversity of agency actions makes it difficult to
render any more precise the APA's general provisions, such as the
definitions of "agency action" and "finality," and the authorization to
courts to compel agency action "unreasonably delayed." In a case such as
Southern Utah, the basic principles animating these provisions are provided
by the APA's text, understood against the backdrop of Congress's intent
and pre-APA administrative law. Those principles tell us that judicial
review should be widely available, that it should be stayed until an
individual suffers some sort of injury to a legally protected interest, and
that courts should take care to respect agency decisionmaking processes
when considering the timing of review, the liability determination (i.e., the
determination whether the agency action was unreasonably delayed) and
the remedy.
The Court's opinion in Southern Utah hides much of the difficulty
inherent in applying these principles by adopting a restrictive overall
approach to judicial review of administrative action. This Article's critique
of that approach attempts to reveal a more context-rich problem than the
Court's opinion lets on. The problem presented by Southern Utah should
demonstrate that application of these general principles can best occur
through case-by-case consideration of how each principle applies in a given
regulatory context, without unduly precise legislative prescription. To
support this argument, the next subpart of this Article considers a
completely separate administrative law issue that shares many of its
fundamental characteristics with the Southern Utah problem.
A. Chevron, Southern Utah, and the Limits of Statutory Language
A conclusion similar to the one just reached might also apply to the
problem of substantive standards of judicial review of agency action.
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Indeed, examination of that issue reveals the same problems that would
arise if the Southern Utah reviewability issue were the subject of
congressional "resolution."
Consider the long running controversy over Chevron6' deference to
agency statutory interpretations.62 Cases dealing with both Chevron's
applicability and its meaning suggest how difficult it is to derive a
predictable rule regarding the deference due such interpretations when
those interpretations come in so many shapes and sizes.63 A particular
problem in the Chevron context is that, after United States v. Mead Corp.,64
two distinct types of deference, Chevron and Skidmore,65 compete for
adoption in every case. For this reason the Chevron issue poses an
additional layer of difficulty beyond simply the correct application of a
standard: before a court can decide how properly to apply the standard, it
must first determine which standard to apply. Thus, consideration of the
proper role for APA amendment on this issue begins with the choice of
standard. At first blush, at least, it would seem that if Congress has any
proper role in resolving the Chevron confusion, it would be in choosing
between Chevron and Skidmore deference.66
But even such a seemingly straightforward choice is quickly muddied by
the real world of administrative diversity. Simply put, different contexts
for agency statutory interpretation decisions justify different levels of
deference. For example, there is something intuitively appealing about
Mead's statement that Chevron deference should be accorded an agency
interpretation when that interpretation results from a process that involves
public input67-that statement seems fundamentally true to the ideal that
61. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62. This Article presumes a basic familiarity with the problem of Chevron's application
and meaning. The academic discussion of Chevron is enormous. Readers seeking to gain
familiarity with the issue would be do well to start with Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2002) (discussing how Chevron altered the
judicial deference paradigm for agencies' statutory interpretations).
63. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363 (1986); STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 298-359 (5th ed. 2002) (supplying samples of post-Chevron
cases that deal with both its applicability and meaning). On the diversity of agency
interpretations and how that diversity affects the level of judicial deference, compare
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947) (reaching independent
conclusion about whether factory foremen are covered by the National Labor Relations
Act), with NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 132 & 135 (1944) (deferring to
NLRB determination of same issue with regard to newsboys).
64. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
65. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
66. Indeed, Congress has in the past expressed interest in making this choice by
mandating de novo judicial review of agency legal interpretations. For a discussion of this
history see Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1, 5-9 (1985).
67. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 220 (explaining that deference should be given for "notice-
and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication").
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legitimate lawmaking requires the people's participation, and that such
participation justifies the label "lawmaking." At the other end of the
spectrum, interpretations that are made without such a participatory
process, 68 in large numbers by a decentralized bureaucracy, 69 on which the
agency specifically warns against third-party reliance,70 and that are
conclusive even as to the requesting party only until the agency decides
otherwise, 7' seem the opposite of "law," and thus not binding on a court.
But because agencies legitimately engage in both types of interpretive
processes there is at least a respectable argument in favor of multiple
deference standards, even at the cost of some legal uncertainty.
This is not to say that Mead provides a perfect roadmap for when to
apply Chevron or Skidmore deference. Mead relies on the fiction of
congressional intent when deciding the Chevron applicability issue and
finds public participation important, but not dispositive, in determining that
intent.72 These features of the opinion allow courts significant leeway in
deciding whether or not to apply Chevron, thus creating no small amount of
uncertainty.73  Still, the hope remains that the process of case-by-case
adjudication may perhaps yield a rule that, while unclear around the edges,
still provides relatively stable guidance for deciding which deference
standard to apply. Of course it is true that Congress could create such
stability at the stroke of a pen. But to create such stability a congressional
rule would have to be expressed as a relatively terse verbal formula, rather
than as a set of factors to take into account, as in Mead. Such a formula
might produce stability only at the cost of responsiveness to the context of
the particular agency interpretation.
Indeed, even a theoretically clear congressional choice might not be
completely clear in application. For example, Congress could simply
prescribe de novo review of all agency statutory interpretations. If any
standard would be stable, the argument might go, it would be simple de
novo review. 74  Yet true de novo review may be a chimera. A court
conducting an independent search for the proper interpretation of a statute
would surely be tempted to give credit to Skidmore-type factors such as the
agency's procedural carefulness, its expertise in the area and the
68. See id at 233.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-3 1.
73. See id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's test for
Chevron's applicability as "wonderfully imprecise" and "utter[ly] flabb[y]").
74. For a discussion of the history of congressional attempts to mandate de novo review
of agency legal interpretations, see Craig N. Oren, Be Careful What You Wish For:
Amending the Administrative Procedure Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1187-93 (2004).
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consistency of its explanation,75 and to import those factors, perhaps sub
silentio, into its analysis, even though these factors do not directly reveal
the correct interpretive choice. The process of becoming persuaded that a
particular statutory interpretation is correct involves more than applying
interpretive tools in a vacuum, at least when one of the parties is the agency
familiar with and responsible for administering the statute. Deference of
some sort will inevitably creep in and cannot be mandated out of existence
by a statutory command. If a congressional command of de novo review
would not translate into true de novo review, then one might well conclude
that other, vaguer, review standards would be even more susceptible to
varying applications.
Similarly, one might wonder how a statutory formula could capture the
complexity of the reviewability issue presented in Southern Utah. If one
accepts that agency actions legitimately come in all shapes and sizes, and
that ideally judicial review of such actions should guarantee a judicial
forum to vindicate rights while respecting agency discretion, then a terse,
clear statutory formula that would appropriately resolve every reviewability
issue seems out of the question.
For proof, one need only examine Southern Utah itself. In that case, the
Court was confronted with a statutory formula-§ 701' s76 general
presumption of review, § 551(13)'s seemingly broad definition of "agency
action," § 704's 77 authorization of judicial review of such action when it is
"final," and § 706(1)'s 78 grant of authority to courts to compel action
"unreasonably delayed"-that seems to do a fairly good job of striking that
balance. Yet, to quote Justice Souter from another context, "we know what
happened ' 79 in Southern Utah. In particular, we know that the language of
these provisions did not convince the Court of the need to make a serious
effort to balance the need for agency discretion with the presumption of
meaningful judicial review. Instead, the Court's analysis of "agency
action" and the limits of mandamus relief was highly formalistic, turning
on restrictive interpretive canons rather than on the framers' vision of a
statute that enshrines fundamental principles.80
75. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
79. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. See supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the Court's interpretation of
"agency action"); see also Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2,373, 2,379
(2004) (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that mandamus review in this case would be
consistent with an agency possessing some discretion to act, on the ground that an action
subject to mandamus review must be discrete, as the Court explained in its analysis of
"agency action"). This Article's criticism of the Court's analysis as unduly formalistic is
not in tension with the understanding that APA must be understood as a compromise
between competing interests. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1950)
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It may simply be that the Southern Utah Court was hostile to the kind of
claim raised by the plaintiffs, and that no statutory language short of an
unambiguous command would have led it to allow judicial review. But
such an unambiguous command would have skewed the playing field too
far in the other direction, given the variety of administrative actions that
should remain within the agency's sole discretion, at least until a latter
phase. This insight only reinforces the basic point that in a world where
administrative action comes in all shapes and sizes, statutory language is
prone to failure when it attempts to mandate a careful, context-specific
balancing between two fundamental but opposing principles. In short, if
context inevitably colors administrative law questions in shades of gray,
then the black and white of statutory ink simply cannot yield the desired
results.
B. The Value of Legislatively Prescribed Factors
One response to the fact of agency diversity and the unhelpfulness of
terse statutory formulas is to suggest that an APA amendment only
prescribe factors that a court could take into account with regard to
questions such as deference standards and the availability of review.
Congress might prescribe factors either in the context of directing binary
choices (e.g., prescribing a list of factors for courts to consider in deciding
whether to apply Chevron or Skidmore deference) or directing how the
ultimate issue should be decided (e.g., prescribing a list of factors for courts
to consider when determining the proper scope of a court's power to
compel agency action under § 706(1)).
But it is far from clear that Congress is the appropriate body to set forth
multi-factor tests. At the very least, there appears to be no advantage in
congressional, as opposed to judicial, prescription of such tests. If Mead is
(stating that "[tihe [APA] thus represents a long period of study and strife; it settles long-
continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social
and political forces have come to rest. It contains many compromises and generalities and,
no doubt, some ambiguities."). Respecting a legislative compromise does not necessarily
require reading the statute as literally as the Court does here, even assuming that that literal
reading is correct. But see supra notes 24-25, where the court notes the drafters' care in
using either "means" or "includes" when defining statutory terms, and noting that the term
"agency action" began with "includes." In this case, the compromise should properly be
understood at a higher level of generality: while agencies were allowed significant
discretion to act, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (authorizing courts to strike down agency actions
that are "arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion"); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1989) (confiningjudicial review to "final agency action" unless Congress states otherwise), judicial review
was also presumed to be available, see supra notes 19-21. These principles are clearly in
some tension, but that tension may sometimes best be resolved by a sensitive judicial
balancing rather than an overly close reading of the text. Indeed, as quoted above, Justice
Jackson, after noting that the APA was a compromise, also acknowledged that "it contains
many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some ambiguities." By definition,
resolution of such ambiguities requires an interpretative decision couched at a higher level
of generality. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 40-41.
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open to criticism because it is unpredictable, or if litigants can dispute
when the TRAC factors justify judicial correction of agency inaction, there
is no reason to think that factors supplied by Congress will be any more
determinative. Multi-factor tests may present problems, but the origin of
the factors in a judicial decision as opposed to a statute is presumably not
one of them.
Indeed, a congressionally prescribed test of this sort might ultimately
prove inferior to a similar one developed by a court, if statutory factors
would not be revisited in response to regulatory evolution. One might
wonder about the likelihood of Congress regularly revisiting administrative
law rules, at least in the abstract (that is, outside the context of a particular
organic statute). The advantage of judicially crafted tests is that they are
constantly tested in litigation, leading to their refinement and alteration as
agency action evolves. For example, the arbitrary and capricious test
evolved significantly between 1946, when the test was essentially one of
minimum rationality, and the 1970s, when courts enunciated a requirement
that the agency take a "hard look" at its regulatory options. 81 The same
might be said for considerations of finality: as rights become
conceptualized as attaching at earlier stages of the administrative process
and as statutes prescribe hard and fast agency duties earlier in the
regulatory process, 82 our ideas not just when of an action is final, but
indeed of how to determine finality, may well evolve. Again, one might
wonder if Congress would likely keep pace with such evolution by
regularly amending the nation's foundational public law statute.
Moreover, such evolution may derive not only from explicit changes in
verbal formulas, but also from their application in cases. Often, textual
formulas-"hard look," "final agency action," "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue" 83 --cannot capture the full
complexity of the concepts they represent, regardless of whether those
81. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §11.4, at 200-01 (3d ed. 1994) (briefly discussing the difference between the
original and the modem understandings of the arbitrary and capricious standard); see also
Oren, supra note 74, at 3-4 ("Vermont Yankee instructed the lower courts that they could not
add to the requirements of the APA. Yet, the Supreme Court itself found in Overton Park-
probably contrary to anyone's expectations when the APA was enacted in 1946-that the
Act calls for a 'thorough, probing, in-depth review' of agency action. This requirement led
in turn to a demand by the Court for reasoned explanation of agency views-a requirement
not found in the APA's express terms-and finally to the declaration that an agency must
engage in whatever procedure is necessary to enable a reviewing court to carry out its
judicial review responsibilities").
82. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 335 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the agency had a mandatory duty to take rivers that qualify as wild and scenic
into account while planning for the use and development of federal land, and that failure to
perform this duty could be corrected by a court).
83. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
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formulas originate in a statute or a groundbreaking judicial opinion. 84
Therefore, even assuming that congressional amendment can keep the APA
current with regard to our evolving understanding of the regulatory process,
it is open to question whether the only tool Congress can wield-the power
to amend statutory text--can fully express the desired change.
Thus, codifying more precise standards in the APA runs two very
different risks. At one extreme, such statutory formulas may become too
rigid, thus hindering desirable administrative evolution. At the other, they
may fail to capture the full complexity of the issue they attempt to address,
thus becoming empty vessels that find meaning only in judicial application.
The latter is a less severe consequence, but if the former turns out to be
closer to the truth, the ossifying effect on administrative law would be
troubling. One of the strengths of the American administrative system is its
flexibility. The key provisions of the APA have survived several
significant changes in regulatory philosophy and the role of judicial review,
from the initial era of trust in expertise to the public participation
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, and finally to the current era's focus on
cost-efficient regulation. These provisions-§§ 553, 704 and 706 to name
the most prominent-have survived because they are worded broadly
enough to accommodate these changes.85 If statutory formulas rigidify the
process then the APA will be less able to do its work of providing the basic
ground rules for a constantly changing administrative regime.
Indeed, Southern Utah should cause concern that well-meaning statutory
precision may in fact end up increasing the rigidity of the administrative
system. The Court's statutory analysis places what is probably fair to
describe as undue weight on the five exemplars of "agency action" found in
the statutory definition.86 Recall that in the Court's analysis those five
exemplars became transformed into the model-types for the entire universe
of affirmative agency action. In turn, those model-types became, through
the alchemy of ejusdem generis,87 the model-types for the failures to act
that the drafters intended to bring within the APA's coverage. Thus, by
providing examples, the drafters of the APA, as read by the Court, ended
84. Even the seemingly precise Chevron formula has led to significant disagreement on
approaches when courts attempt to apply it. See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 319-64 (5th ed. 2002).
85. See Oren, supra note 74, at 1183 ("In short, the APA lasted so long because it
represented scaffolding rather than new construction. Its provisions left plenty of room for
the federal courts to continue to develop administrative law.").
86. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000) ("agency action" includes the whole or part of an
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or the equivalent of denial thereof, or failure to
act") (emphasis added).
87. See supra note 21 and text accompanying.
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up restricting what the legislative history suggests was intended to be a
much broader provision.8
A final observation further counsels in favor of judicial, rather than
legislative, prescription of the factors courts should apply in reviewing
agency action. Judicially prescribed factors can always be understood as
responsive to the pragmatic goal of making the system work, consistent
with its fundamental principles. Courts may ultimately ground such factors
in the APA, but concepts such as hard look review, and the Chevron and
Bennett finality tests are not ineluctably compelled by the APA's skeletal
text.89 Because such tests are glosses on, rather than interpretations of, the
APA, they can be employed fully, partially, or not at all, depending on their
relevance to a given problem, using reasoning akin to that employed by
common-law courts. Mead is an example of such a process, as it narrowed
Chevron's scope in the service of determining an appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny of the particular agency action challenged in that case. 90
Another example is when the Court in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
LTV Corp.91 narrowed Vermont Yankee's 92 admonition against imposing
extra-APA procedural requirements on agencies to ensure that courts have
a record when reviewing informal adjudications. 93
By contrast, legislatively prescribed factors might become seen as
requirements in and of themselves, disconnected from their underlying
purpose of helping to rationalize administrative procedure or judicial
review. Chevron serves as a rough analogy. Just as one value of Chevron
deference is that it allows agencies to shift between regulatory ideologies
without requiring congressional action to unfreeze a statutory
interpretation, so too keeping the APA at a broad level allows courts to
change course to account for changes in our underlying conceptions of the
regulatory process or the judicial role in that process.94
88. See S. REP. No. 752, supra note 29 (detailing the legislative history of the APA).
89. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 81.
90. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
91. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
92. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
93. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 81.
94. Southern Utah ultimately may not be an example of this dynamic. Justice Scalia's
generally restrictive reading of the language of § 551(13) is consistent with his approach to
judicial review of agency action. Compare, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 555-78 (1992) (considering injury in fact to challenge agency action) with Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (considering "agency action" and "finality"). Of
course, it is impossible at this point to know whether other justices in Southern Utah might
have been willing to embrace a broader conception of judicial review had they not
considered themselves bound by their reading of the statutory language.
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CONCLUSION
None of this suggests, a la Dr. Pangloss, that we live in the best of all
possible administrative regimes. Nor does it mean that APA amendments
are always ill-considered. This Article thus concludes with some thoughts
as to the appropriate subjects for APA amendment.
One situation where it might be appropriate to amend the APA is where
a need exists to provide agencies with authority that they do not currently
possess, and could not be thought to possess even under generous and
flexible judicial interpretation of the current text. An example is the power
to experiment with negotiated rulemaking, a process that deviates
fundamentally from the clear requirements of § 553.95 Fundamental
changes in our values might also warrant amendment, as they did with the
Freedom of Information Act96 and Government in the Sunshine Act. 97 It
also might be appropriate to amend the APA when the evolution of
administrative practice has created a large gap in the regulatory regime that
was originally envisaged. For example, it might be appropriate to amend
the APA to mandate general procedures governing informal adjudication,
given the large numbers of such informal proceedings and their perhaps
unanticipated rise in importance since 1946.98
The basic idea governing this theory of APA amendment is that the APA
should function as a skeletal outline of both the rules governing agency
action and the powers that agencies possess. 99 As regulatory practice and
fundamental values evolve it may become appropriate to amend the APA at
this broad level of generality. This approach explains the actual and
suggested amendments above.
Beyond these broad changes, caution should be the watchword before
amending the APA to prescribe significantly more precise procedures or
95. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969
(1990).
96. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
97. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
98. Cf Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 9 (1947)
(stating that one of the purposes of the APA was to provide a uniform rule with regard to
agency adjudications). Even here, though, the vast variety of issues decided by informal
rulemaking suggests the difficulty in drafting a reasonably comprehensive set of rules
governing them. A number of the papers in this symposium address this issue. See Michael
Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA 's Adjudication Provisions to All
Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1041 (2004); Cooley R.
Howarth, Jr., Restoring the Applicability of the APA 's Adjudicatory Procedures, 56 ADM1N.
L. REv. 1081 (2004); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex
Post and Ex Ante Constraints on Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1095 (2004);
John H. Reese, Regularizing Informal Adjudication Under the APA (2004) (unpublished
article) (on file with author); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The APA and the
Back-End of Regulation: Procedures for Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMrN. L. REv. 1197
(2004).
99. Cf Oren, supra note 74, at 1183 (describing the APA as "scaffolding rather than
new construction").
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review provisions.100 Ultimately, the diversity of regulatory action might
make an amendment unhelpful for one of two polar opposite reasons. First,
an amendment might constrict the evolution of administrative law by
enacting rules that, figuratively speaking, not only re-fight the last war but
also freeze the results until Congress is roused to "resolve" the situation yet
again. At the other extreme, amendments that seek to preserve
evolutionary flexibility may do nothing more than what is currently
accomplished by the process of case-by-case adjudication. As explained
earlier, it might be better for flexible rules (or prescriptions of factors) to
emanate from courts, rather than Congress, as in the latter case they might
come to be seen as congressional commands to be obeyed for their own
purpose, and not as pragmatic aids in the pursuit of getting the job done.
Finally, it is important to note that none of this analysis precludes
congressional prescription of procedural or judicial review requirements
unique to a particular agency or regulatory program. Indeed, the thesis of
this Article is that agencies engage in widely varying types of action
depending in part on the type of program they are administering. Thus, for
example, should Congress decide that a particular program demands
delayed judicial review, expeditious judicial review, or even no judicial
review at all, there is every reason for Congress to enact that rule with
regard to that particular program. But the proper place for such detailed
rules is in that program's organic statute, not the APA.
In sum, much of this Article's caution about amending the APA flows
ultimately from the maxim that administrative law is applied constitutional
law. If there is any truth at all to that statement, then it might bear keeping
in mind Chief Justice Marshall's dictum that "it is a Constitution we are
expounding," which should not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code."10'
100. It almost goes without saying that, at the other end of the spectrum, amendments to
the APA's relatively minor details should not pose a significant problem. Of course,
distinguishing "relatively minor details" from more significant changes is not an easy task,
and is well beyond the scope of this Article. One thing that can be said, however, is that
seemingly innocuous amendments such as those changing the definitions of terms used in
the statute, may in fact carry significant weight. For example, a lot rides on the distinction
between a "rule" and an "order," or, as noted above, on the definition of "agency action."
101. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
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